I am a researcher in early modern philosophy, especially Spinoza and Leibniz. My work centres on the problem of individuation and its broader implications for the one-many problem. My doctoral research at the National University of Córdoba (UNC), Argentina, examined how Spinoza and Leibniz approach the constitution and persistence of singular things within their respective metaphysical systems, including the question of how a multiplicity of parts can constitute a genuine individual rather than a mere aggregate. I am particularly interested in the relation between individuation and composition, and in the different ways in which Spinoza and Leibniz understand unity and multiplicity.

During my time at the Human Abilities Centre, I am developing my project The One and the Many in Early Modern Philosophy: Spinoza, Leibniz, and the Connection to Tschirnhaus. The project extends my doctoral research by examining the one-many problem in Spinoza and Leibniz, with particular attention to Leibniz’s critique of Spinoza in the context of his exchanges with Tschirnhaus. I focus especially on the objection that Spinoza’s conception of the unity of substance cannot account for the infinite diversity of things, and on what this objection reveals about the respective metaphysical approaches of Spinoza and Leibniz.